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Abstract The paper analyses the role of regulation in the suppression of disruptive innovations
and shows that this process might be explained by the dependance on the path of joint evolution
of regulation and the mainstream technology. Industrial policy in highly regulated industries
such as wireless telecommunications is able to support evolution of established technologies
and adjust itself to sustaining innovations, while regulatory disconnection impedes disruptive
technologies, and the market plays a quite secondary role in this process. We observe more
innovations in those parts of telecommunications where regulator is less active, but the core, the
physical layer, of the industry is changing in sustaining way of development of the technology.
The paper argues that the problem of impediment to disruptive innovations could be alleviated
if the crucial resources of the industry were accessible for a number of potential innovators and
newcomers. The openness makes easier the appearance of disruptive technologies, and regu-
lation must facilitate it in order to promote opportunities for creative destruction.
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1 Introduction
Despite the different views in Economics on the relationships between innovation and
competition, some aspects seem pretty obvious and even trivial. The best incentives for
innovation activity is the Bthe difference in profit that a firm can earn … compared to what
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it would earn^ otherwise (Gilbert 2006). Opportunity to escape competition and gain a
monopoly and, thus, to charge prices higher than the competitive level is one of the main
driving forces of innovations.1 Therefore, the conduct of a company that innovates is anti-
competitive by its nature, but it does not mean that such behaviour is undesirable from the
point of view of social interests and, thus, is not considered in such a way by antitrust policy.2
What is really desirable is that competitors of the innovator also have opportunities to innovate
and positively affect the innovative conduct of the leader. However, at this particular point the
triviality of the problem disappears and we enter the field of different legal and economics
concepts, tools and methods of dealing with issues related to allocation of exclusive privileges
and antitrust investigations.
The understanding that the aspiration of monopoly is the best incentive for innovation has
moved the economics mainstream to the promotion of the idea that there are needs for
government interventions that would provide exclusive rights for innovators. However, we
can hypothesise that the market per se could be sufficient to the promotion of incentives for
innovators3 and, at the same time, could, possibly, make obsolete any needs to antitrust
interventions. Therefore, it is quite risky to make conclusions that reasons for the victory of
the leaders are their best business practices without paying attention to the fact that regulation
played certain role in this superiority.
For instance, antitrust authorities might investigate the conduct of a company that had,
allegedly, abused their intellectual property rights, inducing the discussion about the validity of
such suspicion, but they can not affect the core of the problem, since the privileges to exclude
others are precisely the main intention of the institution of intellectual property. They can be
trying to assess the potential harm to consumers after a merger of some significant market
players, but it is difficult to take into consideration that the structure of this market had been
already transformed to the oligopolistic form by the regulatory policy and the real market
forces have not already played a noticeable role in the field. Dogan and Lemley (2008) notice
these shortcomings of antitrust law when they point out that Bthreats to competition do not
come only from private conduct in unregulated industries, … [but] also come from govern-
ment regulation itself.…Where it is the state itself that decides upon an anticompetitive end,
the antitrust laws have not intervened.^
Meanwhile, the problem becomes more complicated when the task of antitrust investigation
is not only to develop the theory of harm to consumers, but to understand how the opportu-
nities of market participants for innovations might be harmed.4 However, it should be noticed
that innovations very often come to our life in completely unpredictable ways, and, thus, it
might be merely impossible to assess the potential harm for innovations if even the source of
such unpredictable innovations is uncertain. What is more important is that the real threat for
innovations comes not only from the conduct of leaders, but from the legal frameworks that
determine such conduct and protect positions of incumbents.
1 Such arguments are very common in the justification of the institution of intellectual property. See, e.g., Posner
(2005).
2 Shelanski (2013), for example, notices that BInnovation inevitably leaves some firms behind and may confer
market power on the innovating firm.… innovation greatly benefits consumers and should not be viewed as any
more harmful to competition than when a firm cuts price and thereby leaves its rivals without customers^.
3 Fritz Machlup (1958), commissioned by Congress of the United States to evaluate the country’s patent system,
concluded that BIf we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system
for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.^
4 Some scholars pointed out that B[t]his calls for innovative theories of harm^ (De Streel and Larouche 2015).
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One of the popular theories dedicated to innovations that appeared in the middle of the
1990s (Bower and Christensen 1995), and since that time has been embraced by many
scholars, claims that Bleading firms almost always triumphed in battles of sustaining innova-
tion and that entrant firms typically beat the incumbent leaders when disruptive innovations
emerged^ (Christensen 2006). Disruptive innovation is one of those forces that can yield the
real threats to established firms and Bgenerates the kind of ‘creative destruction’ described by
Schumpeter^ (De Streel and Larouche 2015). Shelanski (2013) points out that due to the
importance of creative destruction, the Schumpeterian approach, despite its arguments about
the negative relation between competition and innovations, does not exclude antitrust inter-
ventions in the regulatory policy.5
Meanwhile, for established firms the best way to protect their positions is to capture the
control over innovations, and here both kinds of innovations, sustaining and disruptive, are
equally important to be controlled. In highly regulated industries, such as telecommunications,
the Banticompetitive end^ might be the result of regulatory activity, and the opportunities for
disruptive innovations might be harmed by regulation.
Since the source of the disruptiveness is not always certain, the possible response to the
attempts to control the development and innovations in telecommunications industry is the
placement of the crucial resources of the field in the realm of Bcommons^. Lawrence Lessig
(2001) uses the similar idea when he talks about the control over the physical layer of a
communications system. The problem is that the most of them by their economic nature are
classic examples of private goods, since they are both rivalrous and excludable. Possibly, we
could base some hypothesis on the enormous potential of the capacity of fiber-optic infra-
structure, but since the access to this infrastructure has physical barriers, its exploitation in the
way of an uncontrolled Bphysical layer^ seems difficult. At the same time, the radio spectrum
by its nature is Bcommon good^, and it is quite possible that technological solutions might
alleviate the problem of the rivalry of this good, and, thereby, transform it into the economic
realm of Bpublic goods^. Another crucial resource of telecommunications, that is also by its
nature is non-rivalrous and non-excludable, is information and knowledge that are controlled
by the incumbents through the institution of intellectual property. It is possible to assume that
the mechanisms of control over these resources maintain the oligopolistic structure of the field
and facilitate the development of the mainstream part of the industry.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the role of regulation in the suppression of
disruptive innovations in telecommunications and to show that this process is explained not
mainly by explicit actions of government in the interests of incumbents, but rather by the
dependance on the path of joint evolution of regulation and the mainstream technology. In the
beginning of the paper, I provide a brief analysis of disruptive innovations in telecommuni-
cations and distinguish WiMAX as a real life example of disruptive technology in the industry,
explain this position and describe the economic model of the technology. Then I use this case
to demonstrate that the failure of this disruption was determined by state interventions in
market mechanisms that, eventually, did not allow to put into practice the economic model,
and protected the established status quo of the area. In the final section I argue that the current
paradigm, that justifies regulatory interventions, heavily depends on the previous way of
5 Shelanski (2013) claims that B[a] natural implication of the Schumpeterian argument is that a firm with market
power would… have an incentive to interfere with the cycle of Bcreative destruction^ by impeding rivals’ ability
to develop new products or services that threaten its dominance.^
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interaction of regulation and technology, and it locks the evolution of the industry on the
mainstream technology, protecting business interests of incumbents.
2 The Disruptiveness in Wireless Communications
2.1 Disruptive Innovations in Telecommunications
According to the concept introduced by Christiansen and Bower in 1995, innovations
could be classified on sustaining, when innovations take place within the existing
market and Btend to maintain a rate of improvement [providing] customers something
more or better in the attributes they already value^, and disruptive, when innovations
Bintroduce a very different package of attributes from the one mainstream customers
historically value^. The initial version of the concept claimed that in the first phase an
innovation performs worse than the main product or services in the market but with
lower prices, and only in the second phase, the quality of the innovation increases and
attracts the mainstream consumers. However, in more general view, a disruption
comes not only from the Blow end^, but also from the Bhigh end^ (Govindarajan
and Kopalle 2006) and from a Bnew market^ (Christensen and Raynor 2003), and it
might be claimed that one of the core features of disruptive innovations is their
financial unattractiveness for the incumbents (Christensen 2006).
We can find some noticeable examples of disruptive innovations in the telecommunications
industry: Skype that has gained the benefits of the market of long-voice telephony, numerous
Internet messengers, that partly substituted SMS services or even traditional voice services, or
Internet video streaming services such as NetFlix. However, the majority of these examples
shares one distinctive feature that, in general, does not entirely fit the concept of disruptive
technologies: entering the telecommunications market from the outside they have not
undermined the positions of the incumbents of the industry.
Indeed, from this point of view these innovations of telecommunications services differ
significantly from other examples of disruptiveness. The appearance of smartphones subverted
the market of mobile phones and destroyed the business of the former leader of the market
Nokia. The introduction of digital photo cameras ruined the business of Kodak. At the same
time, the appearance of Skype, despite of the undeniable significance of the innovation for the
industry, has not destroyed the business of British Telecom, Deutsche Telecom or Telefonica.
There are some concerns of the incumbents about Bcommodization^ of their services
(Larouche 2007; Kushida 2015), but it does not mean the loss of their places under the sun.
The reasons for sustainability of the established players of telecommunications towards
such kind of disruptive innovations are pretty apparent – these innovations did not attack the
infrastructure layer of the industry. They have changed the structure and the models of the
business of incumbents, substituting voice or video traffic by data traffic, but not their
positions. We can also notice that they broadened the borders of the industry and triggered
competition on some of its layers, but did not challenge the core. Moreover, even appearance
of many of these innovations was determined by the development of this core and their
commercial success was merely impossible before the infrastructure layer reached conditions
that allowed their proliferation.
However, even the infrastructure layer of the industry can also be challenged, and history
shows us the case when the landscape of telecommunications could have been changed by
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disruptive wireless technology. From this point of view, WiMAX6 might be to some extent
considered as an attempt to construct an alternative infrastructure apart from the mainstream
industry that could help to form an open and competitive environment in telecommunications.
Nowadays the story of WiMAX has already almost evaporated from the discussions of
telecommunications researchers and many of the main actors of this scene even disappeared
from the list of active players of the field (Alvarion, Redline, Aperto Networks, Airspan, etc.).
Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny that, firstly, this story has had a significant value for
development of the field. Secondly, the entire project cost a lot for the participants and,
possibly, might be considered as one of the most costly undertakings that has ever existed in
telecommunications and has not achieved success. Only Intel alone invested a huge amount in
this idea, and that money was spent not only on R&D or production of WiMAX chipsets, but
also on the deployment of wireless networks7 and even acquisition of radio frequencies
(PCWorld, May 8, 2008). By 2011 there were deployed more than 500 WiMAX networks
worldwide (Financial Times, August 16, 2010), and vendors of consumers electronics supplied
their devices with WiMAX chipsets inside.8 Finally, this case might represent an interest for
the empirical studies dedicated to the analysis of the impact that regulation has on development
of technology, and to the analysis of the intersection of regulation and market mechanisms, that
exposes that technological superiority or even first-mover advantage are not necessary condi-
tions for the victory in the competitive environment in the presence of regulation.
2.2 The Strategic Inflection Point in Telecommunications Industry
The theory of disruptive innovations initially appeared in management science (Bower and
Christensen 1995) and then was adopted by researchers of other areas of social sciences.
Similar ideas can be found in papers of Andrew S. Grove, who was among the chief executives
of Intel Corporation from the time of the creation of the company, and it makes a particular
sense for the purpose of this article, since this company is one of the main actors of the story. In
his works dedicated to management, Grove introduced the concept of Bstrategic inflection
point^ that is trying to describe a situation Bwhen a major change takes place in [the firm’s]
competitive environment^ and requires Ba fundamental change in business strategy^ (Grove
1998).
The end of the XX century and the beginning of the XXI century might be considered as a
Bstrategic inflection point^ for many companies whose main business was in the fields of the
new economy. Even those companies whose market positions seemed sustainable for the outer
6 For the purpose of this article the term WiMAX, that is an acronym for Worldwide Interoperability for
Microwave Access, is used to refer to the IEEE 802.16 standard for wireless metropolitan area networks. The
terms BWiMAX technology^ or BWiMAX standard^ in this paper describe the technology that complied with the
sub-sets of IEEE 802.16 standard approved by the WiMAX Forum, the organisation that promoted the concept
and coordinated certification of compliance with IEEE 802.16 and interoperability.
7 The most noticeable example is Clearwire where the company lost about 1 billion according to its Preliminary
Fourth-Quarter Financial Information published on 7 January 2009 (Available at http://www.intc.
com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=357860), but there were also Orascom Telecom in Egypt, Worldmax in the
Netherlands, PIPEX Wireless in the United Kingdom, Unwired in Australia, Neovia in Brazil, etc. (Intel News
Release, May 22, 2006. Available at http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/releases/2006/20060522corp.htm).
8 For example, in the list of WiMAX Certified products that were approved for the usage in the WiMAX network
of Japaness company UQ Communication there are laptops and tablets produced by Lenovo, Acer, Sony,
Panasonic, Toshiba, Fujitsu, etc. Information available at the website of the company http://www.uqwimax.
jp/english/annai/certification/info.html
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threats were under the risk to lose their business if their markets lose their attractiveness for
consumers due to the technological advances and appearance of new solutions for the
problems of human beings. The digital technologies of the XXI century provided opportunities
for such disruptiveness and left entire markets in the annals of history. Examples are markets of
tape recorders and cassette tapes, analog photo cameras and photographic films, cable radio,
matrix printers, cathode ray tube technology, etc. Meanwhile, not only the digital world
threatened positions of companies that achieved their success in the XX century – the
development of digital technologies also threatened the status quo of the digital marketplace.
Grove (1996) pointed out that Intel, whose main business was production of dynamic memory
chips and who was one of the leaders of this market, in the middle of the 1980s had a real risk
to lose everything and only the decision to change the business and to move the focus on
manufacturing microprocessors allowed the company to protect its positions and to reach
worldwide leadership in the growing market of personal computers.
The threat to the positions of a company comes not only from the industry where it is
active, but also from external markets, and in the case of personal computers, the threat could
be expected, and now we observe its materialisation, from mobile devices. From the beginning
of its appearance, the mobile phone has been more and more transforming to a device with
computational capacity that allows to execute a big variety of different tasks. Modern tablet PC
already might be considered as a real substitution for traditional personal computers,9 but the
main players of the market of components for these mobile devices are not the same as were in
the market of components for personal computers. The growing industry of mobile devices has
been the real, albeit long-term, disruptive innovation for the established industry of personal
computers, and the top-managers of the incumbents of the latter at the turn of the centuries
could already understand it, and, moreover, it could be quite tempting for them to extend their
business to the new area.
Meanwhile, to become a leader of the new field was not easy even for such giants as
Intel Corporation. The incumbents of this market controlled the field through numerous
patents for the essential technologies. Qualcomm in 2000 was already Bemerging as a
kind of Intel of the wireless era^ (FORTUNE Magazine, May 15, 2000), and ARM
Holdings, that licensed its processor designs to other chip-makers including Qualcomm,
Apple, Samsung and others, has become a sort of standard in the growing industry of
chipsets for mobile devices. We can find figures that show that in 2006 about 98% of all
mobile phones already used ARM solutions on their motherboards, and, moreover, the
company had plans to extend its business and to become Bthe architecture for the digital
world^ (CNET, April 3, 2006).
The alternative to the entry to this field could be creation of a new technology and a
new market based on this technology, that would be able to substitute the next stage of
the current way of development of the industry. Therefore, the task could be to find ways
for the creation of this market and alteration of the trajectory of the development of the
industry towards the new technology. In other words, the task was creation of a disruptive
technology for telecommunications in general. In order to protect its positions in the
entire semiconductors industry where growing market of mobile devices threatened the
established order, such companies as Intel had to introduce their own disruptive innova-
tion for the new field.
9 In 2010, Steve Jobs already proclaimed that the Post-PC era has arrived (TechRepublic, June 2, 2010)
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2.3 The Disruptiveness in Different Layers of Telecommunications
and the Economic Model of the Wireless Innovation
In general, WiMAX was not the only example of wireless technologies that could threaten the
established telecommunications business at that time.10 Moreover, we can find information
that before taking the leadership in the WiMAX Forum, Intel executives also considered the
alternatives, but finally stopped their choice on the technology, because they saw that Bonly
WiMAX drove the technology with economic model^ (Fitchard 2008).
When Intel took the leadership in the WiMAX Forum, the concept of the technology had
been transformed from Ban access alternative^, that aimed to be as a wireless solution for the
last mile problem, to Ba platform for mobile computing^ (Fitchard 2008). The way of the
development of telecommunications industry traditionally had in its core voice services, while
data transfer had been gradually added to the technology. The opportunity for disruptiveness
was to turn it upside down and to put the data transfer in the core of the system, while voice
services could be just a part among other opportunities provided by the technology.11
Meanwhile, WiMAXwas not an innovation that could be brought to the market with efforts
of just one creative company, it was a concept that threatened the status quo of different
markets and assumed joint actions of many players from various layers of telecommunications.
The result of these actions could be expressed in alteration of all of these markets, formation of
new business models and creation of new leaders. If Intel was seeking the ways to extend its
semiconductor business in the new area, there were players in other fields that understood their
possible benefits from new markets that could be created by the technology.
From the perspective of telecommunications business, WiMAX was not attractive for incum-
bents of the mobile industry, especially for those who already invested in the creation of 3G
infrastructure (Conti 2005). WiMAX did not assume the evolution of the networks of mobile
providers, but instead required new investments in the creation of new networks that would operate
separately from the cellular networks. Of course, some core parts of the networks infrastructure
might be used for different kinds of networks, but, nevertheless, the adoption ofWiMAX for mobile
carriers could signify excessive investments in the equipment without returns from the previous
undertakings (Weil 2009, 9). In other words, sunk costs associated with their current way of
development made adoption of the non-mainstream innovation highly unattractive to their business
models. From this point of view this technology perfectly fits one of the important features of
disruptive innovations that was noticed by Christiansen and was highlighted in the beginning of this
paper, namely, the financial unattractiveness for incumbents. However, it does not entirelymean that
mobile service providers would never develop WiMAX networks. In order to preserve their
positions and to broaden the spectrum of services they could not entirely rejectWiMAX technology,
but they were reluctant in their response to the emergence of this innovation and it was, definitely,
not the best way of the development of the industry for their business models.12
10 We also can notice Mobile Broadband Wireless Access specification IEEE 802.20 or other subsets of IEEE
802.16 such as WiBro.
11 Intel fellow and CTO of Intel’s wireless group Siavash Alamouti described these Intel’s attempts to enter the
wireless market in the following way: B…this is not an Intel-versus-the-wireless-industry situation… [but] the
computing and electronic industry versus a telecom industry traditionally dominated by voice^. (Fitchard 2008).
12 Moreover, even for the incumbents of the mobile world WiMAX still could be interesting as a strategy for
entry in the new territories, and, as a result, we can find examples of deployment of WiMAX networks by the
world leaders of mobile communications. For instance, there were networks of Vodafone under the brand
Vodacom and the former French monopoly Orange in some African countries, but, again, it rather show the
possibility of the usage of the technology for disruption of existing or creation of new markets.
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The technology was not only unattractive for the established mobile operators, but also for
the incumbents of the traditional wired telecommunications industry. Many of them already
had assets in the mobile business and, thus, there were no reasons to create competition with
other units within their companies. Reasons for the adoption of fixed WiMAX solutions were
even weaker than the possible embracement of the mobile version of the technology: the
implementation of fixed WiMAX for remote areas might be less attractive business than the
monopolistic development of wired infrastructure through the government subsidisation of the
universal service, while creation of such networks in parallel with their existing networks
simply made no sense.
Meanwhile, by the middle of 2010 the total number of deployment of WiMAX networks
reached 500 in 147 countries (Financial Times, August 16, 2010). In some of these cases it was
an attempt of provision of mobile services, but in many it was competition with incumbents of
wired telecommunications and even a natural solution of the digital divide problem.13
WiMAX, despite of its unattractiveness for established players of the field, opened doors for
newcomers or helped to solve the Blocal loop^ problem for those who otherwise had to rely on
the incumbents’ infrastructure.
In 2004, Intel executives claimed that WiMAX technology will Btruly usher in the
broadband wireless revolution^ and saw three phases of the deployment of the technology:
1) outdoor solutions, 2) indoor solutions, 3) mobility (Intel News Release, Jan. 21, 2004). This
three-phases evolution approach was included in the plans of certification of WiMAX
equipment, and there were proposals that this upgrade on the higher phases might be done
through the installation of new versions of software, while the hard core of the network would
remain the same. The third mobile phase of the technology was later considered as one of the
possible versions of 4G mobile telecommunications, however, this candidate for 4G was not
an evolutionary path of the mobile technology, but the mobile version of the fixed wireless
technology.
There were several issues for those who considered to invest in this sort of business, and the
economic model of WiMAX had to have a solution for these problems in order to find
widespread adoption. First of all, the price of the network equipment and end-users terminals
had to be significantly lower than those provided by competing technologies, and in different
phases of the development of the technology different alternatives could be considered as
rivals.
Secondly, there was a necessity to avoid the high costs of installation of end-users
equipment, and it was an issue in the first two steps of the development of the technology,
that were based only on the solutions for the fixed broadband access.
Thirdly, the technology must provide a cost-effective solution for the architecture of the
network in the sense of the coverage area of a base station and required number of the base
stations. It should take into account such aspects as the absence of a line of sight between base
stations and end-users terminals and the necessity to arrange high speeds connections.
Then, there should be a solution for the network infrastructure. The technology allowed to
solve the problem of the last mile, but it was not less important to understand how the core of
the network could be connected with other network elements and, moreover, how it could be
interconnected with other networks. This task could not be solved solely by technological
means, and required active participation of government in the promotion of development of
13 Some even consideredWiMAX as a possible Bcost effective solution to answering the challenges posed by the
digital divide^. (Yarali et al. 2007).
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infrastructure and competition in this area. It was already clear by the time of the appearance of
WiMAX that B[s]uccessful competition for infrastructure can reduce the needs for access
regulation^ (Canoy et al. 2003, 71). At the same time, the European approach that aimed to the
promotion of service-based competition was not the best solution for infrastructure develop-
ment and some recent researches point out these shortcomings of European regulation (Yoo
2014).14
Finally, maybe the most important issue that had to be solved for the attraction of investors
and entrepreneurs is the creation of expectations that this technology will change the world of
telecommunications. Investments in the creation of WiMAX networks for the provision of
services in underserved areas could be a question for new adepts of the technology, but if to
consider the outdoor solutions for the coverage of these areas as just a first stage in the
formation of the future mobile business, then this activity is merely a necessary part of the
whole business model where the desired pay-off will be achieved later.
The leadership of such company as Intel in this project was a noticeable signal about the
commitments of serious players towards the technology. Mo Shakouri, who was a vice
president of WiMAX Forum, pointed out that Bwithout Intel’s support the WiMAX industry
never would have moved so fast^ (Fitchard 2008), and this speed of the development of the
project increased expectations of investors. In September 2007, Intel’s WiMAX plans were
more than ambitious: 150 million subscribers worldwide one year later in 2008; 750 million,
more than 10% of the world population, in 2010; and 1.3 billion in 2012 (Gardiner 2007). Paul
Otellini, CEO of Intel of that time, claimed that the industry is moving toward ultra mobility
and BWiMAX … will be the network that provides that^ (Gardiner 2007).
To summarise, the success of the technology required its widespread adoption that could be
achieved through interoperability, solution of the cost-effective network architecture issue,
provision of expectations of the future alternative telecommunications market and assistance of
governments in the creation of the backbone infrastructure, and would allow to decrease the
prices of equipment and to eliminate the costs of installation. At the same time, these tasks
were highly complicated by the issues of the allocation of radio frequencies and by the
industrial policy, and, moreover, the failure in the finding of the solution for these problems
merely signified that the primary goals would not also be achieved.
3 The Role of Regulation in the Development of Wireless Industry
Technological change is not an independent process as it is assumed by technological
determinism, and the market is not the only social institution that influences technology
(MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999). Regulation co-determines the development of technologies
and even technologies that will be embraced by society, as well as technologies that would be
thrown away from the main course of technological development. Butenko and Larouche
(2015), for example, argue that Bregulation affects which inventions are made, which are
developed, and which are not, as well as which take off, and which do not^. The interaction of
technological change and regulation defines the actions of industry players and shape the
architecture of the network and characteristics of the key technologies, and telecommunica-
tions provide us good examples of how Ball changes in regulation produce important
14 For the discussion about advantages of facilities-based competition see also Lemstra et al. (2015), De Bijl
(2005).
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consequences on the organization of the industry that in turn… have important consequences
on the technology^ (Antonelli 1995). What is more interesting here and what might be referred
from the case of the WiMAX story is that in the current regulatory regime the market plays a
quite secondary role in this process. The victory in the battle between the evolution of the
mainstream technology and the disruptive technology proposed to the market from the outside
was not determined by the superiority of technological solutions or even more sustainable
business models of the established players, but was a consequence of regulatory decisions and
legal norms in some key aspects. Eventually, the economic model of WiMAX could not solve
the problems highlighted in the previous section and there is a clear relationship between this
failure and the government interventions into the market.
Indeed, among the studies dedicated to the comparison of mobile WiMAX and LTE we can
find that LTE did not have technological superiority15 and, thus, earlier WiMAX appearance in
the market could have played as a first-mover advantage. The business models of the
mainstream operators could be threatened by the appearance of newcomers, but chances to
succeed in the telecommunications marketplace for those who were eager to launch the new
wireless business were significantly affected by the regulation of the field.
The deployment of wireless networks heavily depends on the ability of telecommunications
operators to get radio resources. Only very limited parts of the radio spectrum through out the
world are accessible on the free basis, while mostly commercially interesting radio resources
are under the control of governments everywhere, and, moreover, these resources have not
been available for Btwo guys in a garage^16 who could have brought the disruption into the
markets of telecommunication services. On the contrary, the social utility from the economies
of scale, and understanding of the best ways of its achievement incorporated in the economics
mainstream, have always ruled the decision makings concerning the radio spectrum allocation,
and instead of distribution of the radio spectrum for a number of entrepreneurs, it has always
been allocated to small groups of big service providers.17
There is also another area of government interventions, that is very relevant to the field of
wireless technology, as well as to the industries of the new economy in general, and this area is
the institution of intellectual property. As it was mentioned in the beginning of the paper there
is no consensus about the scope of necessary interventions and even a necessity to create
incentives through the provision of exclusive rights. This section of the paper analyses the
impact of both of these aspects, the government intervention in the area of radio spectrum use
and allocation of exclusive rights to objects of the intellectual sphere on the eventual defeat of
the disruptive wireless technology by the mainstream part of the industry, and, at the same
time, discusses the possible positive role of regulation in the promotion of technological
pluralism in the industry.
3.1 Radio Spectrum Allocation
One of the main aspects of the legal frameworks that has always influenced the development
of the industry is regulation of the radio spectrum, and this is not limited to the market of
telecommunications services, but also affects the market of manufacturers. The problem is not
15 Some even claims, that WiMAX performed better in some cases (Roodaki et al. 2014).
16 The term here is adopted from Christensen et al. (2013), who notice that BDisruptive innovations are …
products or services, often created by Btwo guys in a garage^.^
17 Melody (2012), for example, notices that in the EU B[t]he liberalisation objective of stimulating competition
and opening access apparently was not considered to be the cornerstone of spectrum policy .^
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only that the state allocates rights to use radio waves, but it also determines how the spectrum
should be used, and this particular issue makes innovation dependent also on policymakers,
but not only on creative minds.18
The developers of the WiMAX standard from the very beginning had been struggling with
the necessity to comply with spectrum regulation that was different in different places and,
thus, availability of the parts of the spectrum for the future deployment of networks was also
different. For example, the report of the OECD (2006) pointed that BMuch of the success of
WiMAX hinges on the ability of operators to find appropriate and available spectrum^, and
that Bwithout a globally recognized frequency band, the economies of scale will be reduced^.
It was also clearly understood by the members of WiMAX Forum and was expressed in its
official papers dedicated to the regulatory issues (WiMAX Forum 2004).19 Furthermore, the
developers, in order to mitigate the problem and to find some intersections in the regulation of
spectrum in different countries, were trying to adjust technical features of the technology to
these common points by reducing, for example, the required bandwidth for a channel or the
transmission power. However, at the same time, it limited the capacity of the technology.
Even in the 3.5 GHz band the regulation of some countries (e.g., Sweden or the UK) directly
prohibited mobility of telecommunications services Bother than 3G services^ (OECD 2006, 21).
Therefore, while in the higher band (5.7GHz)mobilitywas limited by the laws of nature, in the band
3.5 GHz there was allowed only the competition with DSL due to the legal rules. In some
jurisdictions there were restrictions on the coverage area of base stations that reduced the benefits
of the cost-efficiency of the network infrastructure.20 Regulation of the usage of radio spectrum in
several countries prohibited real mobility in wireless broadband networks, restricting the speed of
end-user devices of such networks to the speed of pedestrians (OECD 2006). Moreover, the most
suitable radio band for the mobility of WiMAX specifications, 2.5 GHz, was reserved for the
evolution of the mainstream technology by the International Telecommunications Union, an agency
of the United Nations, under the IMT-2000 umbrella, and, thus, could not be used in many of the
world countries before the inclusion of WiMAX in the IMT-2000 family (OECD 2006).
The future rules were not determined and were unclear for those who considered to play
this game, and, thus, increased risks of such investments. At the same time, for those who
already had their business within the established order, such uncertainty was not a problem -
they had time to wait, to lobby their interests and to adjust their networks to the sustaining
innovations of the mainstream technology. Even the disruptiveness of the technology could not
provide enough incentives for investors if the future of the regulatory attitude towards the use
of radio frequencies was so uncertain. The unclear situation with the possibility to use lower
parts of radio spectrum (e.g. 2.5 GHz) on the third mobile phase of the technology significantly
reduced the attractiveness of projects related to the first fixed phases for the potential investors.
About all factors of the success of the technology highlighted in the previous section
heavily depended on the decisions of policymakers: the price of technological solutions
18 The concept of technology neutrality is able to some extent alleviate the problem, but this principle was widely
adopted by the industrial policy only after the mainstream of wireless technology defeated the main competitor,
which at that moment was WiMAX.
19 The paper notices Bthe uniform allocation of spectrum worldwide, is crucial to lowering equipment costs
because radios are a major cost component in developing WiMAX Forum Certified systems^.
20 For example, in Russia the coverage area of WiMAX base station in the 3.5 GHz radio band was restricted to
3 km with the maximum power of radio transmitter -10 dBW. The same maximum power of radio transmitter
was established for Wi-Fi (Decision of GRFC 28.11.05№ 05-10-01-001), and compliance with such rule merely
made the economy of such networks quite doubtful.
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required economies of scale that could not be achieved without global adoption of the
standard, the limitations imposed on the usage of wireless networks affected the cost-
efficient architecture and the costs of installation, the uncertainty and the restrictive policies
on the mobility decreased the expectations. Even solution of the problems of interconnections
and backbones in many places of the world required government assistance and could not be
solved independently from incumbents. In countries with a low level of concentration in the
industry, with advanced fiber-optic infrastructure that was not totally under the control of
incumbents and where there were possibility for its costs-efficient construction, like in Russia,
the main problem to the entrance to the wireless market was a solution of radio frequencies
allocation problem, while in those countries where telecommunications infrastructure was just
recently opened for competition or was under the total control of incumbents the problem of
entrance was more complicated.
The WiMAX technology was unable to achieve global adoption, and the final stage of the
life of the project began in 2010, when it already became apparent that the mobile version of
the standard lost the battle with LTE. This period revealed some examples that show that
expectations of those who invested in the WiMAX projects hoping to obtain in the future the
broader parts of radio spectrum and to extend their services were wrong. Dutch company
WorldMAX21 was forced to shutdown its WiMAX network in June 2010 because the
government, in excuse of national security, put restriction on the license of the company
regarding the usage of radio spectrum (Vos 2010). Just one month before, the company
Freedom422 left the market of telecommunications services in the UK because the regulatory
policy did not permit provision of mobile services on the WiMAX network of the company
(Baker 2010). However, strictly speaking, mobility in the radio band 3.5 GHz is limited also
by economic rationales, but what is more relevant to the problem is that the company was also
unable to get frequencies in the 2.6 GHz radio band (Baker 2010).
The similar problem of impossibility to extend the radio resource of deployed fixed
WiMAX networks into the radio band that allows mobility was observed in other parts of
the World. The main explanation of this situation is that these radio resources were obtained by
the mobile incumbents for the development of their networks,23 and for them, as described
earlier, WiMAX was not the best alternative among WiMAX and LTE.
3.2 Issues of Intellectual Property Related to the Wireless Technology
As was noticed above, the economic model of the wireless technology requires a cost-effective
network infrastructure. This could be achieved only if the technology incorporates the most
advanced relevant technological achievements that existed in the industry at that time. In the
world where ideas are not free and the owners of intellectual goods have rights to exclude
others from the participation in the technological progress, the entities that were able to
concentrate the rights on the most essential solutions for technological development have
power to affect the total outcome of the industry. In the analysed case such Bintellectual
21 According to some estimations, Intel Capital and Enertel Holding jointly invested 37 million USD in the
creation of this network in Amsterdam. (Higginbotham 2010)
22 This company was also the project with investments of Intel Capital (Intel News Release, Feb. 11, 2008)
23 Possibly, the most noticeable exceptions from this pattern were Clearwire in the US and Yota in Russia, but in
the second case the company gained frequencies and got opportunities to deploy networks in most of the Russian
regions when WiMAX was already doomed and the company turned its efforts towards LTE.
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monopolists^24 had very apparent interests in the promotion of the mainstream of the wireless
telecommunications, rather than to allow disruptors to challenge their business positions.
Ericsson, the leader of the market of mobile networks equipment, joined the WiMAX
Forum in 2004 (Ericsson Press Release, Dec. 13, 2004). The company has had Bone of the
industry’s strongest intellectual property portfolios^ (Ericsson Press Information, Feb. 2007),
but has never been among the manufacturers of WiMAX equipment. Among those who were
able to significantly benefit from the technology and who really produced certified WiMAX
equipment were such companies as Alvarion, Airspan, Navini, Aperto Networks, etc. These
companies might really be considered as outsiders of the market of wireless equipment and as
disruptors of the established market. However, in the case of the victory of WiMAX in the
competition for 4G standard they could get a portion of the pie. Some researchers argued that
wide adoption of BWiMAX as a 4G standard would be crisis for Ericsson and Nokia Siemens
Networks^, and, as a result, these companies had to adjust their strategies to the promotion of
LTE, and intellectual property rights could be a powerful tool for the achievement of such goal
(Seo 2013, 169-171). In 2006 Ericsson terminated its participation in the WiMAX project and
devoted its resources to HSPA and LTE. WiMAXwas rather the threat than the opportunity for
the company that controlled about the third of the mainstream market.
The most noticeable player in the sphere of mobile standards, Qualcomm, was also among those
who had opportunities and incentives to determine the future of wireless technology, and, according
to the claims of some experts, openly opposed the development ofWiMAX (Bloomberg, September
3, 2007). In 2005, The Economist, describing the role of Qualcomm in the third generation wireless
networks, claimed that B[b]ecause its technology underlies the third-generation mobile-phone
standard, Qualcomm has become a toll bridge that all equipment-makers must cross^ (The
Economist, Oct. 20, 2005). In 2005 - 2006, Qualcomm significantly increased its patent portfolio
concerning, inter alia, crucial solutions for WiMAX technology by the acquisition of the developer
of MIMO technology25 Airgo and the pioneer and developer of OFDM technology26 Flarion, and
became the holder of Bthe most widely licensed in the industry^ patent portfolio that Bapplies to all
existing 4G standards… including… LTE… and…WiMAX^ (Qualcomm’s LTE/WiMAX patent
licensing statement, Dec. 2008). Some experts, commenting the acquisition of Flarion by
Qualcomm, even claimed that BQualcomm has now got its hands on all future mobile technology ,^
and directly pointed out that, as a result of it, BWiMAX … might face problems^ (Lewan 2005).
From the perspectives of disruptiveness of the mainstream wireless business for the market of
traditional PC and WiMAX for the mainstream telecommunications, such actors of the semicon-
ductors market as Qualcomm had clear reasons to be in favour of the wireless mainstream.
In order to help to promote the WiMAX technology in the middle of 2008 Intel jointly with
Cisco,27 Samsung, Alcatel-Lucent and telecommunications service providers Sprint Nextel and
Clearwire formed the patent pool Open Patent Association. The primary goal of the organisa-
tion was proclaimed Bto foster a global ecosystem focused on delivering broader choice,
competitive equipment and service costs for WiMAX technology, devices and applications^.28
However, they did not manage to attract to this patent pool all companies that possessed the
24 The term Bintellectual monopoly^ here is adopted from Boldrin and Levine (2008).
25 MIMO is an essential element of many modern wireless standards.
26 OFDM is a method of encoding digital data that has also found wide application in the wireless standards.
27 The company in 2007 for $330 million acquired noticeable player among WiMAX manufacturers Navini
Networks (FORTUNE Magazine, Oct. 23, 2007).
28 The website of the organisation is available through Internet archive https://web.archive.
org/web/20110727151012/http://openpatentalliance.org/
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essential patents for the technology. The response of the mainstream industry was the commit-
ments of the main patent holders Bto a framework for establishing predictable and more
transparent maximum aggregate costs for licensing intellectual property rights (IPR) that relate
to 3GPP Long Term Evolution^ (Ericsson Press Release, April 14, 2008).
Qualcomm did not join any of these agreements, but introduced in the same year their own
FRAND patent statement. Qualcomm put it in the way that LTE and WiMAX Bwill be used to
complement existing 3G deployments to help address the growing demand for mobile data^,
but the initial purpose of WiMAX was not the complementing of 3G deployments. The
technological and logical continuation of 3G networks could be only LTE from these two
alternatives, and it was clear for the senior executives of Qualcomm. Peter Lancia, Sr. Director
in Marketing of Qualcomm, noticed that BLTE will provide a parallel evolution path to 3G, and
will leverage 3G’s scale and ecosystem of vendors, operators, consumers and application
developers^ (OnQ blog at the Qualcomm’s website, May 25, 2010).
3.3 Promotion of Competition and Technological Pluralism in the Industry
Although the promotion of competition is among the priority goals of the industrial policy, the reality
of modern days shows us that all layers of the industry have been becoming more and more
concentrated, and this concentration takes place on the global level. By 2015, the major part of the
market of mobile infrastructure equipment was already under the control of just four companies:
Ericsson, Nokia, Alcatel-Lucent and Huawei, and nowadays, when Nokia finally gained control
over Alcatel-Lucent, the oligopolistic structure has become even more prominent. The number of
mobile service providers has also declined, and some European mobile markets have already
changed their structure from four to three operators (Austria, Germany, Ireland, etc.).
The analysis of this paper is drawing the link between the regulation and the ongoing
process of concentration of the industry, but this does not mean that in the pure laissez-faire
system we would not face the similar problem or a set of other issues. As it was noticed above,
the success of WiMax was practically impossible without assistance of governments in the
creation of the backbone infrastructure and efficient solutions of the problem of interconnec-
tion. These crucial resources were under the control of incumbents, and for them the alternative
development of the industry was not the best possible option, while new entrants, who could
bring the disruption in the market, were in a dependent position from the conduct of the giants,
and only industrial policy aimed at the promotion of technological pluralism and competition
could alleviate the problem.
At the same time, if the aim of the competition policy is the promotion of competition
between the main players, who already invested in development of the mainstream technology,
but not facilitation of access for new entrants and opening doors for them for bringing new
technologies, then we can hardly expect the appearance of innovations that threaten the
mainstream course of the development due to the problem of sunk costs of the incumbents.
Antonelli (1995) in his analysis of technological change in telecommunications points out that
Bthe larger the variety of independent players, the larger the opportunities to generate new
technologies^, and it has a particular sense for the recent story of the wireless industry. There
were a number of sets of 2G standards, then there were just two 3G sets of standards, and there
is the only one standard considered as 4G technology. However, if the technological pluralism
was a target of the industrial policy, then we could expect not only to have the diversity, but
also to observe the continuing process of creative destruction in this viable field of the new
economy.
J Ind Compet Trade
4 TheMutual Shaping of Technology and Regulation in Telecommunications
The regulation of telecommunications has evolved since the appearance of the industry,
addressing its efforts to new issues that have been arising with the development of the
technology. However, not only technology raises problems before policymakers and affects
legal norms, but legal norms, in turn, affect the development of technology. In social sciences
dedicated to regulatory issues this idea is expressed in the concept of mutual shaping of
technology and society (e.g. MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999). Meanwhile, in a case of
disruptive technology in highly regulated industries there could be an issue, because the law
has been developing along with the mainstream of the industry and it has created the
playground for the mainstream players, while for the technology that assumes an alternative
way of the functioning of the field the old rules could be inappropriate or even hostile.
In other words, law and technology not only mutually shape each other, this mutual shaping
process is able to form the high level of dependence on the previous way of development and
protect the mainstream course of the technology from external threats. Many scholars point to
the problem of Bregulatory disconnection^ (Brownsword and Goodwin 2012; Brownsword
and Somsen 2009) or Bpacing problem^ (Marchant et al. 2011), the situation when the pace of
development of technology is faster than of the law that aims to regulate this technology
(Butenko and Larouche 2015). The WiMAX case shows us that industrial policy in highly
regulated industries is able to adjust itself to sustaining technologies, even if with the time lag,
while this disconnection impedes disruptive innovations. As a result, the incumbents of the
field might even benefit from this pacing problem.
If, for example, there was no problem of interference, then there would not exist any need to
solve this problem through regulation, but, at the same time, if this problem can be solved by
means of legal tools and there are obvious beneficiaries of this mechanism, then the necessity
to seek alternative ways of its solution is not so actual, unless it fits the aims of the main
industry’s actors. Moreover, even when technology is already able to provide such solution,
and nowadays we can hear claims that this time has already come (e.g. Werbach 2004; Staple
and Werbach 2004), the regulation is very reluctant to change its paradigm. The new
technological paradigm might signify not only dramatic alteration of regulatory approaches
without clear understanding of the final results, but also may have a significant negative impact
on the business interests of current major players, and, thus, this regulatory shift is not
desirable neither for the incumbents nor for the policymakers.
This is not only the case of radio spectrum or industrial policy of telecommunications in
general. It is the pattern that can be found in many cases when a regulated industry faces
disruptive innovations. Uber or Airbnb, for instance, have also experienced numerous ob-
structions from the side of regulation.29 However, the attempts of policymakers to protect the
established business interests is not necessarily a case of regulatory capture, but also their
natural response to the threats to stability, since new technology might convey unpredictable
consequences.
It is also necessary to notice that some innovations, like, for example, implementation of
BitTorrent protocol that has disrupted the copyright industry, or mentioned above Uber or
Airbnb, have a crucial advantage compared to innovations in wireless telecommunications.
29 One of the Wikipedia articles is even dedicated to the BLegal status of Uber’s service^. Airbnb also has the
explicit opposition of regulation in many parts of the world: Canada (Montreal Gazette, April 29, 2015),
Germany (Guardian, May 1, 2016), Russia (RBC, Oct. 8, 2015), and so on.
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They provide more opportunities for their users to disobey the law, and, thus, have more
chances to success, while in the case of wireless technology the deployment of a network
might require a high level of investments without the possibility to dissolve this activity in the
ocean of other radio pirates, and that increases risks of potential Bviolators^ and enhance the
opportunity for law enforcement.
At the same time, the problem of impediment to disruptive innovations due to regulatory
disconnection could be alleviated if the crucial resources of the field were accessible for a big
number of potential newcomers. In the same way as the end-to-end principle of the Internet
architecture facilitated growth of diverse online services (Lessig 2006), the physical layer of
the industry could also make possible the appearance of new disruptive technologies and
business models if the industrial policy were aimed to promote accessibility of the resources.
Of course, there is no shortage of justifications of limitations of freedom of potential radio
spectrum users from the positions of public interests, but it is also necessary to notice that more
and more scholars nowadays claim that if we take into account the modern technologies, then
many of these assumptions are obsolete (see Werbach 2004; Staple and Werbach 2004;
Milgrom et al. 2011). Moreover, the ideas that radio spectrum, or, at least, some of its parts,
represents a common resource that should be returned to the realm of commons have become
popular among many scholars (e.g. Benkler 2002; Lessig 2001; Werbach 2001). However, it is
also possible to admit, that, on the one hand, this discussion about openness of radio spectrum
could be quite futile without robust economic models that could drive innovations in this field
providing numerous benefits for various strata of society, but, on the other hand, it is difficult
to expect the appearance of such models without understanding the possibility of their
implementation due to the total control of the resource in the interests of major players.
The idea of the open spectrum emerged before the appearance of WiMAX, and, indeed, the
widespread implementation of this concept could become the significant part of the growing
sharing economy. It is difficult to say now whether WiMAX or another wireless technology
with the similar idea could really benefit from the openness of radio, but we can hypothesise
that in this case this technology had more chances than the long term evolution of the
mainstream. However, we can not truly say that WiMAX Forum aimed the efforts to promote
the technology within the open spectrum concept, but the comparison with Wi-Fi, that mainly
operates in the unlicensed frequencies, was one of the main parts of the leitmotif of the story
(e.g. Intel News Release [Intel Outlines BroadbandWireless Vision], Jan. 21, 2004). Moreover,
WiMAX camp considered the operation of WiMAX networks in the license-exempt parts of
radio spectrum (Intel 2005). The license-exempt 5 GHz band was among the Binitial bands of
focus^ (WiMAX Forum 2004), but this radio band increases requirements of line of sight and,
thereby, decreases the commercial attractiveness of the technology.
Meanwhile, innovations in the unlicensed parts of radio spectrum are able even to change
the core assumptions of the mainstream economic models. For example, the phenomenon of
community networks, where the infrastructure is a common-pool resource, hardly fits the
mainstream understanding of the economics of telecommunications. Such networks provide
services for dozens of thousands of subscribers and compete with the giants (Baig et al. 2015),
but, again, one of the problems of their development is the access to the resources that are
necessary for creation of this common infrastructure. However, if the scenario of the WiMAX
camp about the widespread adoption of the technology and significant reduction of prices of
WiMAX equipment was fulfilled, then this technology could be a powerful tool for such
innovative business models. Moreover, the mesh topology of network architecture, that
Benkler (2002) described in the model of the BIdeal Open Wireless Network^, and that is
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widely used in the wireless community networks, was placed in the agenda of the evolution of
WiMAX (Wei et al. 2005).
In the field of intellectual property WiMAX proponents promoted the idea about open
patent system for the technology B[t]o help ensure product differentiation and interoperability
at a more predictable cost^ (Intel News Release, June 9, 2008), but they were not able to
include in this pool the essential claims of the opposition of this technology, and again, it
exposes the development of the mainstream institutions of our society that, even if uninten-
tionally, protect the established status quo.
Although the institution of intellectual property and allocation of radio frequencies both
represent the examples of government intervention in the mechanisms of the free market, they
are quite different by their nature. In the case of radio spectrum distribution, the problem is
based on physical characteristics of radio waves, that are expressed in the limitation imposed
by the mother nature, while in the second case this is mainly an attempt to provide a utilitarian
solution for economic issues, but not the problem imposed by the physical features of our
world.
If we consider regulation as the institution that forms the common playground for different
actors, then we might expect to see the difference between institution of intellectual property
and norms of allocation of radio frequencies. Government establishes the same rules for all
members of society to get protection on the results of creativity of human minds, and,
theoretically, anyone can use these mechanisms for his business purposes. There is a restriction
for the usage of a particular idea, but not the restriction for the use of alternatives.30 At the
same time, the allocation of radio frequencies a priori does not assume the pluralistic landscape
of commercial wireless networks and allows to allocate these privileges only to a very limited
number of actors. However, it is possible to argue that this difference in some cases is mostly
theoretical. Inventions might be essential for the entire industry without possibilities to invent
around,31 and, thus, it could be an analogy between property rights on such resource and
property rights on an essential part of the radio spectrum, merely because it might be an
absence of alternatives in both cases. Since the technological inventions are not the result of
individual genius but the natural consequence of technological development of our civilisa-
tion,32 even patent races to some extent might be considered as an analogy of Braces^ for radio
frequencies, and, thus, both these institutions similarly promote the ongoing process of
concentration of the field.
The optimal design of the institution of intellectual property in economics is often consid-
ered as a proper balance between provision of incentives for innovations and resulting
monopoly prices and deadweight losses (See e.g. Merges 2000). However, the effect on prices
is not the only economic effect generated by this institution, and some argue that we must
weigh the benefits of IPR Bagainst the costs of the centralization of economic decisionmaking
and the creation of barriers to innovation and market entry^ (Wu 2006). From this point of
view, the most important economic effect of IPR is on industry structure and it reflects the idea
that regulation, affecting the industry structure, also affects the architecture of the network.
Centralisation of decision making about the technological development inevitably affects the
process of technological change and expresses in the architecture of the network that is, as
30 It leads some to the conclusion that BIP rights are rarely if ever Bintellectual monopolies^.^ (Lemley 2009).
31 Some even claim that Bknowledge can be considered as an essential facility^ (Antonelli 2007).
32 Such position is quite common, and, for example, can be found in Scotchmer (1991).
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Antonelli (1995) notices, Bstrongly influenced by the changing characteristics of clay
technologies^.
In their highly cited article of 1986 Sah and Stiglitz, analysing the process of decision
making depending on architecture of an economic system, argue that, due to the imperfectness
of decision making process and limited capabilities of human minds, polyarchical systems,
whose architecture is represented by Ba market oriented economy ,^ provide more opportunities
to accept Bgood^ innovations, while in hierarchies, where decision making is centralised, the
risk to sort out such projects is higher. At the same time, they claim that the advantage of
hierarchical systems is that they better cope with Type II errors, when it would be more
reasonable to reject some accepted projects. Tim Wu (2006) emphasises that since
decentralised systems (polyarchies) are able to approve more projects than hierarchies, Bthey
manage to capture the few available profitable ideas^. Following the logic of this literature and
taking into account that the technological variety of the wireless industry presented in the
market is not so diverse, it is possible to argue that facilitation of decentralised decision
makings in the industry would provide more chances for valuable ideas to materialise in the
technological solutions.
Meanwhile, the decentralisation and pluralism are highly dependent on the institutional
environment that, as it was highlighted above, requires active participation of the regulator.
Access to radio frequencies, essential radio technologies, infrastructure and interconnection
points are those issues which efficient solution, possibly, was able to change the course of the
wireless industry. What is also interesting here, is that without regulatory participation in the
solution of these issues even assured access to long term financial institutions, and in the
WiMAX case we observe that Intel and others have invested a lot in the project, is not
sufficient for the achieving success. Moreover, inability to get access to the industrial resources
merely signifies that financial support of even a lucrative idea at an early stage of its
development would be highly limited, and, again it plays as a discouraging factor for
innovations in the field.
Nowadays, when intellectual property rights on wireless technologies have become more
concentrated, when the most interesting parts of radio spectrum have already been assigned to
the mainstream, and, moreover, when they already have been propertisized by the incumbents,
the entire future of the industry is totally in the hands of these proprietaries - proprietaries of
technology, infrastructure and radio waves, and we do not have robust reasons to assume that
such a system is able to better appreciate potential innovations than an open and competitive
marketplace. As it was mentioned in the beginning of the paper, this is not the problem of
market concentration that could be solved by the implementation of antitrust, but this is the
problem of the exclusive rights that were granted by regulation and that finally created the
barriers for the appearance of any disruptions.
5 Summary and Conclusions
The analysed initiative to change the established wireless industry was totally defeated by the
incumbents of the field. The industry has become more concentrated than it was 15 years ago,
and this tendency is observed in all layers of telecommunications.
It is possible to draw some analogy of the WiMAX case with other cases of standard wars
such as competition between Betamax and VHS. There were studies that claimed that Betamax
was a superior standard, but, nevertheless, lost the battle, and, thus, it is possible to assume that
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the choice of the market did not represent the best possible outcome (Liebowitz and Margolis
1995). However, here is the crucial difference of these two cases. In the Betamax-VHS case
the market played the superior role in the adoption of the technology, while in the WiMAX-
LTE case the role of the market was secondary and the outcome was mainly determined by
regulation. Moreover, Sony, whose videotape format was defeated by JVC, was able to bring
to the market the DVD format (in collaboration with Philips, Toshiba and Panasonic) and
avoid the mistakes of the previous experience. The introduction of DVD was a clear disruption
for VHS industry. The DVD format provided obvious advantages for participants of the home
video market and, eventually, replaced VHS as a method of video distribution. On the one
hand, these two examples show us, that the market does not exclude a risk to sort out superior
technology and from this point of view it is impossible to argue that it solves the problem
better than regulation, but, on the other hand, it leaves more chances for a technological shift at
the later stages compared to the regulatory policy that creates opportunities for leaders to
determine technological development. Moreover, even if the market outcome is not the best
from short-term efficiency perspectives, industrial pluralism is able to be a basis for a future
technological breakthrough.
We observe more innovations in those parts of telecommunications where regulator is less
active, but the core, the physical layer, of the industry is changing gradually in sustaining, not
disruptive, way of development of the technology. Regulation has locked-in the future
development of the industry on the mainstream technology and eliminated alternatives.
Meanwhile, the WiMAX story shows us that not only that concentration in telecommunica-
tions is not a necessary condition for the innovative development, but also that disruptive
technologies are able to attract investments in this field from newcomers and weak players of
the industry, putting the mainstream under the pressure of competition, and fostering innova-
tions in their business. However, innovations require accessibility of the main resources and
that might be achieved only if the resources are in the common domain. Even if WiMAX was
not the technology that could benefit from this openness, it had chances to evolve to the
version that could. The main advantage of the open access to the essential resources is that the
openness makes easier the appearance of disruptive innovations, and regulation must facilitate
this openness in order to promote the opportunities for creative destruction.
The alternative viewpoint might be that the process of technological change should be
governed in public interests by public agencies because they have abilities to weigh costs and
benefits of different technological regimes and choose more suitable direction for social
interests. In fact, this is an alternative representation of the old discussion about virtues of
Bthe invisible hand^ and the opinion, like of Stiglitz (2001), that this hand Bis simply not
there^, and the diversity of the theories of modern economics does not provide us any
uniformity. However, even if we assume that the problem of regulatory capture is not relevant
to the issue, and that the regulator is able to understand social interests and bases its actions on
this understanding, we still cannot escape from the problems of epistemological limitations,
transaction costs and information asymmetry, and, thus, we do not have reasons to believe that
public agencies are able to govern the process of technological change better than market
mechanisms.
The phenomenon of sunk costs has a deterring effect on the adoption of non-mainstream
innovations by incumbents, while for potential new entrants this issue does not exist if they
have not invested yet in currently presented technological solutions and they might be eager to
jump into an alternative technological paradigm. However, if resources in the industry are
under the total control of incumbents, then their decision about the use of such resources can
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not be free from the influence of the previous investments, i.e. the presence of sunk costs
heavily affects the direction of technological change if the decision making is centralised in the
hands of the main players. Therefore, if regulation contributes to such centralised decision
making and if the outcome of the decision making is affected by the presence of sunk costs,
then this contribution shapes the entire way of technological change. Meanwhile, active
participation of newcomers in innovation activity may facilitate the process of creative
destruction and, thereby, result not only in positive economic effects, but also in alleviation
of socio-economic problems (see., e.g., an analysis of the impact of this process on income
inequalities in Antonelli and Agnieszka 2016).
Nowadays the LTE camp analyses the possibility to use the technology in the unlicensed
radio bands and considers that technology is able to be adopted by private entities as an
analogy of Wi-Fi. The same was heard in 2004 - 2010 from the disruptors of the mainstream
market, but now the ideas of the disruptive innovation have been transformed into the
sustaining innovation of the orthodox part of the industry. Furthermore, now the regulation
moves towards such experiments, but, again, this movement supports the mainstream. It shows
that regulation is able to support evolution of established technologies and adjust itself to
sustaining innovations, but if leaders win in battles of sustaining innovations and entrants have
opportunities to beat incumbents when disruptive innovations emerge (Christensen 2006), then
this is the regulatory regime that does not leave chances to change the landscape of the core of
the industry but not the superiority of the leaders.
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